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STATE EXECUTIVE LAWMAKING IN CRISIS 
JIM ROSSI† 
ABSTRACT 
  Courts and scholars have largely overlooked the constitutional 
source and scope of a state executive’s powers to avert and respond to 
crises. This Article addresses how actual and perceived legal barriers 
to executive authority under state constitutions can have major 
consequences beyond a state’s borders during times of crisis. It 
proposes to empower state executives to address federal and regional 
goals without any previous authorization from the state legislature—a 
presumption of state executive lawmaking, subject to state legislative 
override, which would give a state or local executive expansive 
lawmaking authority within its system of government to address 
national and regional goals during times of crisis. 
  Although the approach of this Article is to suggest a solution for 
state courts, based on state constitutional interpretation, its analysis 
also recommends an approach for state legislatures as they consider 
state emergency management statutes, as well as for Congress as it 
considers national emergency management legislation. 
INTRODUCTION 
Courts and scholars have largely overlooked the constitutional 
source and scope of a state executive’s power to avert and respond to 
crisis. The conventional public policy reaction to disasters and to 
regional or national problems focuses on expansion of federal 
jurisdiction or authority. Recent examples include the terrorist acts of 
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September 11, 2001, and the natural disaster Hurricane Katrina 
brought to the coasts of Louisiana, Mississippi, Florida, and Alabama. 
The policy reaction to both of these disasters embraced significant 
national compensation and public works investments. These disasters 
engendered much discussion about the pace and size of the federal 
response, but little attention has focused on the state or local laws 
that play a role in defining, and often limiting, executive emergency 
authority. Where state and local laws are discussed, criticism is 
typically directed toward individual political leaders or a single state’s 
poor reaction following a disaster or national or regional problem.1 
There is, however, scant discussion of the legal structure under which 
state and local officials make their decisions. 
This Article addresses how actual and perceived legal barriers to 
executive emergency powers under state constitutions, such as 
separation of powers, can and do have major consequences beyond a 
state’s borders. My inquiry stems from recent crises, but it is not 
limited to the reaction to September 11 or Hurricane Katrina. 
Instead, this Article’s discussion of state constitutions is proactive and 
would be generally applicable to states.2 The Article proposes a 
specific way of conceptualizing state executive power that transcends 
any single crisis or jurisdiction, and that will improve the resiliency of 
states to respond to interstate crises while also furthering the goal of 
political accountability. Its primary proposal is to empower state 
executives to address federal and regional goals without any previous 
authorization from the state legislature—a presumption of state 
executive lawmaking, subject to state legislative override—to give a 
state or local executive expansive authority within its system of 
 
 1. For example, the House of Representatives report evaluating the Hurricane Katrina 
disaster emphasized “a failure of initiative,” pointing to human and operational factors at the 
state and local level, rather than to specific state and local legal reforms. See generally SELECT 
BIPARTISAN COMM. TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANE 
KATRINA, A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE: FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT BI-PARTISAN 
COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANE 
KATRINA (2006), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/katrinareport/mainreport.pdf. 
 2. Given that state and local executive power is guided by fifty different state 
constitutions, rather than one common U.S. Constitution, this presents a more difficult 
challenge than the debate surrounding executive power under the U.S. Constitution. Implicit in 
this analysis is the theme that state constitutions serve similar functions in a federal system, 
regardless of differences in their specific texts. See Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Constitutional 
Theory and Its Prospects, 28 N.M. L. REV. 271, 288–302 (1998) (“My suspicion . . . is that the 
cluster of issues which emerge within states’ legal and political systems at this time in our history 
raise similar stakes and have more or less similar shapes.”). 
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government to address national and regional goals during times of 
crisis. This presumption would serve as an interpretational tool for 
state courts, executives, and legislatures, as well as for Congress, in 
addressing the issue of state emergency executive powers. 
Part I examines the structure of decision making by state 
executives during times of interstate crisis, with a particular emphasis 
on the constitutional structure under which state executives manage 
crisis and the tensions presented in sharing crisis authority with 
national emergency management regulators. I present three examples 
to illustrate the problem with crisis management through state 
executive declaration of emergency: the September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks, California’s electricity deregulation crisis, and Hurricane 
Katrina. As the responses to these events illustrate, successful 
interstate crisis management under the current system requires a 
governor to declare an emergency under state law and, in the course 
of doing so, may also require a state executive to assert more 
constitutional authority than state separation of powers otherwise 
affords. State executive emergency powers are not always on solid 
constitutional ground, as it may be perceived that state legislatures 
retain the ability to constrain the executive or it may be perceived 
that federal law preempts state regulatory action. 
Part II argues that, in times of crisis, the constitutional basis for a 
strong state executive is more compelling than the case for a strong 
national executive.3 At the outset, it is helpful to recognize that not 
every policy issue rises to the level of a crisis. A “crisis” is 
unexpected, requires immediate response, and has unambiguously 
unpleasant and serious consequences if left unaddressed.4 This 
distinguishes policy issues, such as social security reform, from crises, 
such as the immediate aftermath of the September 11 terrorist 
 
 3. Although I focus on state constitutions, for discussions of executive authority during 
times of crisis under the U.S. Constitution, see generally Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency 
Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029 (2004); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating 
Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV. 605 (2003). See also Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, 
Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047 (2005); Mark 
Tushnet, Controlling Executive Power in the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2673 (2005). 
 4. This definition draws from Roger D. Congleton, The Political Economy of Crisis 
Management: Surprise, Urgency, and Mistakes in Political Decisionmaking, 8 ADVANCES IN 
AUSTRIAN ECON. 183, 183 (2005). 
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attacks, the California electricity blackouts, or the devastation caused 
by Hurricane Katrina.5 
I argue for broad executive authority under state constitutions 
during times of interstate crisis, including lawmaking and spending 
power, notwithstanding potential separation of powers limitations 
and implied federal preemption restrictions on the state executive. 
Regardless of a state’s constitutional text, broad executive powers 
must extend to proactive crisis aversion as well as to crisis response. I 
argue that these powers are inherent executive powers. Although 
inherent, however, these powers are not exclusive, in that they are 
concurrent with the legislature’s power to adopt law and to spend 
public money. Because the legislature is always able to override the 
executive’s decisions on such matters, there is little to be gained from 
judicial review. Other than monitoring whether there is an egregious 
abuse of declaration of an emergency, as may occur where an 
executive declares a crisis for purely partisan political purposes, I 
argue that state courts should have little or no role in managing such 
emergency powers. The exercise of executive emergency powers is 
most effectively policed by the state legislature and not courts. 
The proposed presumption of state lawmaking authority 
advances our understanding of the emergency powers of state 
executives. More importantly, the presumption holds promise for 
both state constitutional law and for law reforms involving crisis 
management. State courts themselves would ideally adopt such a 
presumption, making it a commonplace fixture of state constitutional 
interpretation by the judiciary. Of course, a scholarly inquiry into the 
issue is not likely to be endorsed wholesale by all fifty state courts, 
particularly given that the issue of executive power typically does not 
present itself to a state court until the opportunity to correct the 
problems it presents has passed. Even if state courts do not adopt this 
presumption wholesale, however, recognizing such a presumption as 
an aspect of state constitutionalism could have other benefits. For 
example, recognition of such a presumption can guide emergency 
legislative reforms at the state level, focusing state legislatures on the 
kinds of reforms that are most likely to make a difference in 
emergency planning and management rather than on micromanaging 
 
 5. Throughout this Article, the term “crisis” is used to describe the triggering event, 
whereas the term “emergency” is used to describe a legal status for the assertion of executive 
powers. This distinction reflects the more prevalent use of the term emergency rather than crisis 
in most statutes and constitutions. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 19–33. 
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state executives in constitutionally futile and harmful ways. Such a 
presumption could also be endorsed by Congress in national 
emergency federal legislation, thus preempting any ambiguities 
regarding executive emergency powers that already exist under state 
law. 
I.  THE STRUCTURE OF  
DECISIONMAKING BY STATE EXECUTIVES IN CRISIS 
It is common to expect that federal regulators will serve a 
predominant role in emergency management,6 but that is not how 
existing national emergency management laws are structured. Federal 
law gives state and local governments, not the national government, 
the primary responsibility to lead in crisis management.7 For example, 
the structure of the Stafford Act,8 which authorizes the president of 
the United States to declare emergencies, views federal resources as 
supplementing state resources.9 State governors generally must 
request that the president declare an emergency, at which point a 
state submits to the cost-sharing criteria laid down in federal law.10 
The president can declare emergencies on his own, but only when he 
determines that primary responsibility for addressing the emergency 
lies with the United States, rather than the particular state facing the 
emergency situation.11 The role of state executives in emergency 
management is thus fundamental to the operation of federal 
emergency management law. 
 
 6. See Jo Becker & Lyndsey Layton, Safety Warnings Often Ignored at Metro; Responses 
to Derailments, Track Flaws and Station Overruns Have Fallen Short, Records Show, WASH. 
POST, June 6, 2005, at A1; Gilbert M. Gaul, Lack of Funds Reduces Frequency of Health 
Inspections; Many U.S. Surgery Centers Are Overdue for Review, WASH. POST, July 25, 2005, at 
A8; Jane Perlez & Kirk Johnson, Behind Gold’s Glitter: Torn Lands and Pointed Questions, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2005, at A1.  
 7. See Jonathan Walters & Donald Kettl, The Katrina Breakdown, GOVERNING MAG., 
Dec. 2005, at 20, 22 (noting that crisis management remains primarily a state and local, not a 
national, problem). 
 8. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-288, 
88 Stat. 143 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5206 (2000)). 
 9. The Stafford Act’s requirements are described at length in ELIZABETH B. BAZAN, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ROBERT T. STAFFORD DISASTER RELIEF AND EMERGENCY 
ASSISTANCE ACT: LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR FEDERAL AND STATE ROLES IN 
DECLARATION OF AN EMERGENCY OR MAJOR DISASTER (2005), available at http://fpc.state. 
gov/documents/organization/53688.pdf. 
 10. 42 U.S.C. § 5191(a). Provisions detailing cost-sharing requirements may be found at 42 
U.S.C. § 5193. 
 11. 42 U.S.C. § 5191(b). 
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Federal law does not speak to the actions of state institutions in 
managing disasters or requesting federal aid, leaving these largely to 
state constitutions and state statutes. Although state executives 
possess substantial power under state constitutions to declare an 
emergency, the scope of executive power after an emergency has 
been declared is frequently unclear. Declaring an emergency under a 
state constitution may allow a state executive to address a crisis by 
granting the executive sweeping emergency lawmaking powers, 
including appropriation authority. Indeed, the texts of many state 
constitutions allow state executives to exercise fairly broad 
emergency powers.12 However, the use of state emergency powers has 
experienced mixed success, due to shared authority problems 
between state executives and state legislatures, as well as authority 
problems between state and federal officials. At their worst, these 
shared authority problems create a credit/blame game, in which there 
is fierce competition between institutions to take credit and avoid 
blame.13 In situations where the political goals of the executive are not 
identical to the legislature or to national officials, there is a strong 
potential for inaction in the face of crisis and, at the extreme, blame. 
A. State Constitutions and the Declaration of Emergency 
Given predominant notions of legislative supremacy under state 
constitutions, state legislatures frequently limit state executives, 
including during times of crisis. State separation of powers principles 
sharply limit the power of the executive branch to exercise authority 
not specifically assigned to it, either under a state’s constitution itself 
or pursuant to legislative delegations. For example, many state 
constitutions limit the power of the executive branch to engage in 
rulemaking absent a specific delegation of power from a state 
legislature.14 Adding even more uncertainty, most state constitutions 
fragment the executive into multiple elected officials, as opposed to 
the single elected official at the national level in the office of the U.S. 
 
 12. See infra notes 18–33 and accompanying text (addressing the Louisiana and Alabama 
constitutions). 
 13. For a discussion of how shared authority affects the powers of mayors, see Richard C. 
Schragger, Can Strong Mayors Empower Weak Cities? On the Power of Local Executives in a 
Federal System, 116 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2006) (manuscript at 114–29), available at 
http://law.bepress.com/uvalwps/uva_publiclaw/art47. 
 14. See Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist 
Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1187–1216 (1999) (discussing 
limits on state agency rulemaking under various state constitutions). 
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president.15 Multiple elected executive officials may make it unclear 
what powers the chief executive—the governor—has when the other 
state-wide executives are unavailable or unable to act.16 
However, state constitutions may extend far broader emergency 
powers to a state agency, even where a state legislature has not 
spoken to the issue. In addressing an emergency, such as the 
blackouts that plagued California’s deregulated power markets in 
2000 and 2001, an executive may possess powers independent of the 
specific statutory program under which it exercises regulatory 
power.17 The state and local response to Hurricane Katrina is a classic 
emergency situation, in which state officials were able to assert 
broader lawmaking powers to respond to the crisis, notwithstanding 
the separation of powers restrictions in Louisiana’s constitution.18 
Many state constitutions explicitly provide for the declaration of 
emergencies in their texts. However, state constitutions rarely speak 
clearly as to what triggers an emergency, to the scope of the executive 
branch’s power to make controlling law (including the power to 
engage in agency rulemaking), or to the exercise of other executive 
powers during a crisis that falls short of official declaration of an 
emergency. As I suggest below, many state legislatures purport to 
elaborate on these powers by statute, although the constitutional 
power of a state legislature to define the emergency powers of the 
executive is unclear. 
Louisiana’s constitution gives strong powers to the executive—
the Louisiana governor, the state’s “chief executive officer”19—during 
 
 15. See William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency?: Governors, Independent Attorneys 
General, and the Lessons from the Divided Executive, 116 YALE L.J. (forthcoming 2006) 
(manuscript at 1–2), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=882895 (discussing the “‘divided 
executive,’ in which executive power is apportioned among different executive officers not 
subject to gubernatorial control” (quoting Patrick C. McGinley, Separation of Powers, State 
Constitutions & the Attorney General: Who Represents the State?, 99 W. VA. L. REV. 721, 722 
(1997))). 
 16. Even states that have multiple elected executive officials recognize unique and more 
comprehensive powers for a governor, often in express constitutional provisions. For example, 
the governor is frequently designated the chief or supreme executive, has special obligations to 
execute laws, proposes a budget, and has veto authority, sometimes including a line item veto. 
See id. (manuscript at 14–15). 
 17. For a discussion of California’s emergency response, see infra notes 45–58 and 
accompanying text. 
 18. On separation of powers under Louisiana’s constitution, see Jay S. Bybee, Agency 
Expertise, ALJ Independence and Administrative Courts: The Recent Changes in Louisiana’s 
Administrative Procedure Act, 59 LA. L. REV. 431, 434–37, 437 n.27 (1999). 
 19. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 5. 
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times of crisis. It establishes an Interim Emergency Board to 
appropriate state funds when it is determined that an “emergency or 
impending flood emergency exists.”20 Louisiana’s governor is given 
the power to call state armed forces “to preserve law and order, to 
suppress insurrection, to repel invasion, or in other times of 
emergency.”21 The governor may also convene a special legislative 
session “in the event of public emergency caused by epidemic, enemy 
attack, or public catastrophe.”22 The Louisiana constitution further 
provides for the continuity of government, allowing the legislature to 
specify how the state government will operate when incumbent 
officials are unavailable to perform their duties.23 
By statute, the Louisiana legislature has delegated several 
supplemental powers to Louisiana’s governor during a crisis. Statutes 
hold the governor responsible for “meeting the dangers to the state 
and people presented by emergencies or disasters” and, in order to do 
so, authorizes the governor to “issue executive orders, proclamations, 
and regulations,” which shall have the “force and effect of law.”24 A 
disaster or emergency is to be officially declared by executive order 
and continues for thirty days, unless terminated or renewed by the 
governor.25 During a time of emergency, the legislature has granted 
the governor enormous powers, including the power to “[u]tilize all 
available resources of the state government and of each political 
subdivision of the state as reasonably necessary to cope with the 
disaster or emergency.”26 As a check on the use of emergency powers 
by the executive, “by petition signed by a majority of the surviving 
members of either house” the legislature retains the power to 
“terminate a state of disaster or emergency at any time.”27 
Alabama takes a slightly different approach than Louisiana. 
Alabama’s constitution vests in the governor the “supreme executive 
power.”28 The governor of Alabama has the power to call for a special 
session of the legislature in extraordinary circumstances,29 but the 
 
 20. Id. art. VII, § 7. 
 21. Id. art. IV, § 5. 
 22. Id. art. III, § 2. 
 23. Id. art. XII, § 11. 
 24. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29:724 (2006). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. ALA. CONST. art. V, § 113. 
 29. Id. art. V, § 122. 
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constitution does not speak more generally about the governor’s 
emergency powers. The emergency management provisions of 
Alabama’s code allow the governor to declare a state of emergency in 
cases of attack or natural disaster of significant proportions, but do 
not speak expressly to emergencies in other situations.30 Immediately 
upon declaring an emergency, the governor must call the state 
legislature into special session, and the emergency can be terminated 
by the governor or by joint resolution of the legislature.31 During a 
time of emergency, the governor has the authority “[t]o enforce all 
laws, rules and regulations relating to emergency management and to 
assume direct operational control of all emergency management 
forces and helpers in the state.”32 The Alabama code speaks to the 
specific authority the governor possesses during a crisis, such as the 
power to formulate and execute plans for the control of traffic.33 A 
catch-all provision appears to allow the governor “[t]o perform and 
exercise such other functions, powers and duties as are necessary to 
promote and secure the safety and protection of the civilian 
population,”34 but in Alabama, the governor is not given general 
emergency lawmaking or appropriation authority. 
Under Louisiana’s approach, the state constitution and 
legislative framework give the executive broad emergency powers. 
However, not every state extends such broad powers to state 
executives. Alabama’s approach illustrates how there is quite a bit of 
variation from state to state in the ex ante management of state 
executive emergency powers. Not every state executive is delegated 
the same degree of power by the state legislature. As a constitutional 
matter, given the dearth of case law in individual jurisdictions, it is 
frequently unclear whether these emergency powers are inherent 
executive powers or emergency powers delegated by the state 
legislature.35 How these emergency powers are classified is important 
in at least two respects. First, to the extent that emergency lawmaking 
is not recognized ex ante as an inherent executive power, at a 
 
 30. ALA. CODE § 31-9-8 (2005). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), it was recognized that, 
under federal separation of powers principles, the executive’s power to issue an emergency 
order stems either from an act of Congress or from executive authority under the Constitution, 
id. at 585. 
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minimum it is unclear whether state constitutions grant broader 
powers to governors and other executives to act during a crisis, 
independent of legislative delegation. This uncertainty may 
encourage inaction by state executives where ex ante authority is not 
clear. For example, if Louisiana did not have a statute elaborating on 
the governor’s emergency powers, it would be unclear whether the 
governor would still possess emergency powers under the state 
constitution. In a state like Alabama, where the state legislature has 
designated attacks and natural disasters as statutory grounds for 
declaring emergencies, it is unclear whether the governor possesses 
broader authority to declare an emergency in response to an energy 
or man-made environmental disaster. Second, although courts may 
possess the power to review executive compliance with a statute, to 
the extent that emergency powers are not fully specified, it is not clear 
that courts have any power to limit state executive authority during 
times of interstate emergency or crisis. After illustrating why the 
answers to these questions might matter to state and local crisis 
management, I address them by arguing that the best interpretation 
of state constitutions is to treat executive emergency lawmaking as an 
inherent rather than delegated power, and that as a general matter, 
this power should not be reviewable by state courts. 
B. Actual and Perceived Limits on State Executive Emergency 
Powers 
Even if limits on state executive power are not judicially 
enforced, the existence of any perceived limits on state executive 
powers during times of crisis is problematic for both pragmatic and 
democratic reasons. Pragmatically, during ordinary times state 
legislatures meet infrequently and often for only a few months each 
year. Without a strong executive, a state may not see itself as capable 
of addressing an interstate crisis at all.36 Some states have attempted 
to address this problem in the emergency context by requiring a 
governor who has declared an emergency to immediately call the 
state legislature into session (which could allow the legislature to 
authorize executive action ex post).37 Other states do not require the 
governor to call the legislature into session until the time of an 
 
 36. Various approaches to executive power in different state constitutions are discussed in 
Rossi, supra note 14. 
 37. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 31-9-8 (2005); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26-303 (2005); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 38-3-51 (2006); IDAHO CODE § 67-5506 (2006); MINN. STAT. § 12.31 (2005). 
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emergency expires—too late to authorize a governor or other official 
to take action during the emergency.38 
The democratic problems presented by perceived limits on 
executive power are more serious—and more complex. Where it is 
not preempted by federal law, the power of state officials to declare 
and manage an emergency has been recognized to be an area entirely 
within the core sovereignty of state government.39 If state officials 
perceive any limitations on state executive authority, this creates an 
opportunity for state officials to evade responsibility for a failure to 
act. Regardless of whether actual limits may exist or be enforced, 
therefore, the existence of perceived limits under state constitutions 
may leave states both powerless to address a crisis and without any 
constitutional responsibility for taking action. Perceived limits may 
arise under state separation of powers, where a legislature has 
attempted to limit executive authority under emergency framework 
statutes. Alternatively, the prospect of federal preemption hobbles 
state officials from confidently asserting state authority against the 
backdrop of ambiguous federal law. 
Three recent examples of emergency responses illustrate the 
democratic challenge posed by perceived limits on state executive 
constitutional power, particularly when state executives share 
regulatory turf with state legislatures and federal authorities. 
Declaration of an emergency by a state executive is frequently the 
beginning of negotiation between state and federal regulators. 
Although such negotiation between state and federal officials may go 
smoothly—as occurred between New York and the White House in 
the high-anxiety weeks following September 11—it can break down 
where state executives are not able to assert themselves as possessing 
comprehensive authority to act on behalf of the state. These problems 
are particularly apparent outside of terrorist attacks (for which a 
strong national response is expected), and can be exacerbated where 
a state’s governor comes from a different political party than the U.S. 
president—California’s electricity crisis and Hurricane Katrina are 
leading examples. This breakdown in communication highlights the 
 
 38. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 26.20.040 (2006); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 8624 (West 2006); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 48-924 (2005); MONT. CODE ANN. § 10-3-302 (2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
288.15 (2005); S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-3-420 (2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-5a-5 (2005); WIS. 
STAT. § 166.03 (2006). 
 39. See Duke Energy Trading & Mktg. v. Davis, 267 F.3d 1042, 1053–54 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(noting that, during California’s electricity crisis, California’s Governor possessed broad 
emergency powers, to the extent they were not preempted by federal law). 
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need for a clear constitutional understanding of executive emergency 
authority at the state level. 
Following the attack on the World Trade Center on September 
11, 2001, chaos erupted in New York City. Despite the precarious 
climate, the emergency response decisions of local, state and federal 
officials were unambiguous, swift, and relatively smooth. Governor 
Pataki made an immediate declaration of an emergency,40 which was 
followed by President Bush’s quick release of federal disaster 
resources for the area.41 It is clear that FEMA broadly construed the 
Stafford Act to afford New York City federal funding for rebuilding, 
even where the legal limits on funding had been exceeded, and even 
released unspent federal money to state and local officials.42 The 
reaction to this disaster was unified and swift, perhaps reflecting both 
President Bush’s characterization of the target of the attack as 
America,43 as well as the strong sense of trust that may have existed 
among political allies across local, state, and national levels of 
government.44 
California’s blackouts provide a very different illustration of 
federal-state coordination in response to a state declaration of 
emergency. In June 2000, warm weather posed a challenge to a 
relatively new electric deregulation plan adopted by the state 
legislature. Several hundred thousand California customers were left 
 
 40. See Press Release, Governor George E. Pataki (Sept. 11, 2001), http://www.ny.gov/ 
governor/press/01/sept11_1_01.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2006). 
 41. See Press Release, FEMA (Sept. 11, 2001), http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease. 
fema?id=5692 (last visited Sept. 28, 2006). 
 42. The Stafford Act limits the federal share of any rebuilding obligations to 75 percent. 
For a discussion of the Stafford Act, see generally U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DISASTER 
ASSISTANCE: INFORMATION ON FEMA’S POST 9/11 ASSISTANCE TO THE NEW YORK CITY 
AREA (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03926.pdf. 
 43. In his comments to the nation on the evening of September 11, President Bush stated 
“America was targeted for attack.” Press Release, George W. Bush, Statement by the President 
in His Address to the Nation (Sept. 11, 2001), http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/sept_11/ 
pres_state001.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2006). Earlier that day, in making remarks at a Florida 
school, he had referred to an “apparent terrorist attack on our country.” Press Release, George 
W. Bush, Remarks by the President After Two Planes Crash Into World Trade Center (Sept. 
11, 2006), http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/sept_11/president_008.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 
2006). 
 44. Mayor Giuliani, Governor Pataki, and President Bush, of course, all shared the same 
political party, allowing September 11 to become a major rallying cry for the Republican party. 
See Richard L. Berke, A Nation Challenged: Political Memo; Attacks Shift Spotlight on Public 
Figures, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2001, at A1 (discussing how September 11th popularized certain 
political figures). 
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without power.45 The state feared more substantial blackouts could 
ensue, and when wholesale power prices (which federal regulators 
allowed to be set in the competitive market) skyrocketed, California 
utilities were placed in serious financial jeopardy because they were 
subject to a price cap on retail rates under the state deregulation 
plan.46 California governor Gray Davis quickly declared a state of 
emergency and authorized the Department of Water Resources to 
buy power as part of a plan to stave off the Southern California 
Edison and Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) bankruptcies and, as a 
consequence, further blackouts.47 He also requested that federal 
regulators intervene to help avert California’s crisis.48 However, the 
ultimate management of California’s deregulation crisis resulted in 
finger-pointing between federal regulators, who did not want to 
impose price caps on the wholesale market, and state regulators, who 
had requested price controls.49 This standoff reflected a deep 
ideological divide between California politicians, who favored the 
intervention of federal regulators, and the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC), which had embraced competitive wholesale 
markets and eschewed price controls.50 California’s governor, 
meanwhile, had limited options in two respects. First, federal law 
preempted many of the governor’s actions, although ambiguities in 
federal law left other possible actions in a difficult gray area. For 
example, it has been noted that California’s governor did not possess 
 
 45. Terry Perry & Nancy Rivera Brooks, California and the West; Lawmakers to Hold 
Hearing on Utility Bills; Energy: Reacting to Complaints About Soaring Costs in San Diego 
County, They Plan To Consider Amending, Delaying or Killing Deregulation Bill, L.A. TIMES, 
July 21, 2000, at A3. 
 46. Chris Kraul, U.S. To Decide Action on State Energy Crisis; Utilities: Regulators Today 
Will Release Plans for Tackling Electricity Costs. Potential Solutions Include Price Caps, Moves 
To Foster Competition, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2000, at C1. 
 47. Jonathan Peterson, The Recall Campaign; Energy Remains a Litmus Test on Davis as 
Manager, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2003, at C1. 
 48. Governor Davis pursued a lawsuit designed to force federal regulators to impose limits 
on wholesale prices. Martha McNeil Hamilton & Greg Schneider, Price Caps Have 
Questionable Record; Even if California Gets Controls on Electric Costs, They May Not Help, 
WASH. POST, May 31, 2001, at E1. He also sent a letter to Congress which prompted Congress 
to urge federal regulators to act more aggressively. Richard Simon, Senator Fires Warning Shot 
on Power Costs, L.A. TIMES, June 7, 2001, at A1. 
 49. Miguel Bustillo & Nancy Vogel, California and the West; The California Energy Crisis; 
Failure To Buy Entire Network May Doom Davis’ Power Deal, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2001, at 
A3. 
 50. Megan Garvey, The Energy Crisis; FERC Issues Power Ruling, L.A. TIMES, May 17, 
2001, at A20. 
06__ROSSI.DOC 11/14/2006  8:39 AM 
250 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 56:237 
authority to commandeer federally-owned electricity generators in 
the Naval Base in San Diego, no matter how necessary this may have 
been to the citizens of California.51 In other respects, however, the 
scope of federal authority may have been more ambiguous, as federal 
regulators had not spoken clearly to any kind of prohibition of long-
term contracts on the wholesale market. The state governor could 
have made a decision to exercise some authority over these contracts, 
but did not attempt to do so. Second, the market structure in 
California had been approved under state law, which limited the 
governor’s range of options in response to the crisis.52 For example, he 
did not use his emergency powers to suspend price controls under the 
state statute, nor did he order utilities to use more stable long-term 
contracts in lieu of the newly deregulated California spot market for 
electricity.53 Eventually, federal regulators declared an emergency 
requiring natural gas and electric suppliers to provide power to the 
state’s utilities,54 two of which had filed for bankruptcy, but federal 
intervention was too late to make a substantial difference in the state. 
Governor Gray Davis continued to criticize federal regulators for 
their slow response to the crisis.55 At the same time, many have also 
criticized Governor Davis for his inaction in responding to the crisis, 
other than the narrowest possible state regulatory responses that 
served to place any blame with federal regulators.56 Ultimately, until 
federal regulators imposed restrictions on wholesale prices and 
California’s legislature intervened to allow the state itself to buy 
power through long-term contracts, the situation was highly 
unstable.57 Some have pointed out that there were party politics 
 
 51. Duke Energy Trading & Mktg. v. Davis, 267 F.3d 1042, 1055 n.9 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 52. Peter Behr, Calif.’s Davis Lacked Legal Ability to Solve Energy Crisis; Meltdown May 
Have Generated a Political Power Failure, WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 2003, at A4; Miguel Bustillo & 
Nancy Vogel, Special Legislative Session To Tackle Electricity Crisis; Energy: Democrats Favor 
Larger State Role, While GOP Backs Market-Based Answers. PUC Likely To OK Rate Hikes, 
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2001, at A1. 
 53. Behr, supra note 52; Bustillo & Vogel, supra note 52. 
 54. Nancy Vogel, California and the West; Ruling Shields Generators From Risk; Crisis: A 
Federal Agency Says Power Plan Operators Can’t Be Forced To Supply Electricity Without a 
Guarantee of Payment. Regulators Are Accused of Abandoning Consumers, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 15, 
2001, at A3. 
 55. Mark Z. Barabak & Nancy Vogel, The State; Riordan Attacks State Energy Role; 
Power: Candidate for Governor Urges Reduced Regulation and Criticizes Gov. Davis, L.A. 
TIMES, Nov. 8, 2001, at B8. 
 56. Behr, supra note 52. 
 57. Richard A. Oppel Jr., Enron’s Many Strands: The Energy Market; Signs Enron Bet on 
Price Increase Before California Power Shortage, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2002, at C1.  
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lurking in the background, which might have encouraged inaction and 
finger-pointing by state and local officials.58 
Government responses to the massive flood disaster following 
Hurricane Katrina revealed a similar dynamic, with much more 
drastic consequences for human life. Initially, when Hurricane 
Katrina led to severe flooding in New Orleans and elsewhere on the 
Gulf Coast, state and local officials declared an emergency59 and 
quickly requested federal aid.60 Louisiana’s governor, for example, 
declared an emergency and established the Louisiana Recovery 
Authority, a special-purpose administrative agency with fairly broad 
powers.61 Federal authorities, however, were extremely slow to react 
to the disaster in Louisiana and elsewhere.62 As was the case in 
California, the pace of federal relief led state and local officials to 
place blame with federal regulators.63 Meanwhile, federal regulators 
blamed state officials for failing to use their authority to force 
evacuations and for not communicating regularly with FEMA.64 State 
 
 58. The state of California and federal regulators faced off for months, “pointing fingers at 
each other.” Behr, supra note 52. FERC embraced a regulatory approach, favoring no 
intervention in market-set prices. Id. California alleged energy suppliers were gouging prices. 
Dana Milbank, Both Political Parties Say Enron Proves Their Point; Democrats Eye Calif.; GOP 
Points to Probe, WASH. POST, May 8, 2002, at A5. 
 59. Wil Haygood & Ann Scott Tyson, ‘It Was as if All of Us Were Already Pronounced 
Dead’; Convention Center Left a Five-Day Legacy of Chaos and Violence, WASH. POST, Sept. 
15, 2005, at A1. 
 60. Ken Silverstein & Josh Meyer, Katrina’s Aftermath; Louisiana Officials Indicted Before 
Katrina Hit, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2005, at A17; Peter Applebome et al., A Delicate Balance Is 
Undone in a Flash, and a Battered City Waits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2005, at A17. 
 61. Reuters, Katrina Recovery Panel Announced, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 2005, at A11. 
 62. Elizabeth Bumiller, Democrats and Others Criticize White House’s Response to 
Disaster, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2005, at A16; Josh White & Peter Whoriskey, Planning, Response 
Are Faulted, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 2005, at A1. 
 63. Eric Lipton et al., Breakdowns Marked Path From Hurricane to Anarchy, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 11, 2005, at 1.1. This failure to respond to a disaster that had been imminent for days was 
seen as poor reflection on the Department of Homeland Security’s ability to react to any future 
disasters, especially terrorist attacks. Johanna Neuman & Nick Timiraos, Chertoff Evokes 9/11 
in His Katrina Defense, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2006, at A12; Katrina’s Aftermath—The Response; 
Put to Katrina’s Test; After 9/11, a Master Plan for Disasters Was Drawn. It Didn’t Weather the 
Storm, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2005, at A1.  
 64. Adam Nagourney & Anne D. Kornblut, White House Enacts a Plan To Ease Political 
Damage, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2005, at A14; see also Susan B. Glassner & Josh White, Storm 
Exposed Disarray at the Top, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 2005, at A1 (“Other federal and state 
officials pointed to Louisiana’s failure to measure up to national disaster response standards, 
noting that the federal plan advises state and local emergency managers not to expect federal 
aid for 72 to 96 hours, and base their own preparedness efforts on the need to be self-sufficient 
for at least that period.”). 
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officials in Louisiana, for example, had objected to the White House’s 
requests to give the Pentagon control over the state’s National Guard 
troops.65 Given the different partisan affiliations of the state and 
federal officials involved, political rhetoric and blame led to inaction. 
Ambiguities regarding the scope of federal preemption and state 
separation of powers may have contributed to this inaction.66 
Given the swiftness of executive action in reaction to such crises 
as the September 11 terrorist attacks, the California electricity crisis, 
and Hurricane Katrina, judicial intervention seems unlikely, if not 
futile. When asked to resolve conflicts regarding the exercise of 
emergency powers, courts simply cannot act quickly enough. Even if 
they could, their consideration of the assertion of emergency powers 
invites the judiciary into a thicket of highly volatile and frequently 
politicized issues. However, on occasion state courts have been asked 
to intervene in executive assertion of emergency powers, sometimes 
by a state legislature and sometimes by private stakeholders affected 
by emergency executive decisions. Judicial decisions often limit the 
scope of executive power. Judicial consideration of the executive 
powers exercised by state officials during emergencies consistently 
reinforces the understanding that there are no inherent executive 
powers under state constitutions, only delegated powers that must be 
managed by previously adopted statutes. This contributes to a limited 
understanding of executive power under state constitutions, which 
could encourage inaction by state officials in reaction to emergencies. 
For example, following California’s declaration of an emergency 
to address the state’s electric power supply shortage, challengers filed 
a writ of mandamus asking the state to end its declaration of 
emergency. A state court of appeals determined that judicial 
consideration of the writ of mandamus was appropriate under the 
state emergency statute, given that the governor had issued his 
executive order under this statute rather than as an inherent 
constitutional power to declare an emergency.67 The court reasoned 
 
 65. Walters & Kettl, supra note 7, at 24. 
 66. One account emphasizes how state and federal officials had trouble defining the formal 
legal boundaries among federal, state, and local authorities. See id. at 20 (“What is more critical, 
and has significant implications for the future of emergency management in the United States, is 
the need to explicitly and thoroughly define governments’ roles and responsibilities so that 
officials in other jurisdictions don’t suffer the same sort of meltdown in the next natural or man-
made disaster.”). 
 67. Nat’l Tax-Limitation Comm. v. Schwarzenegger, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 4 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) 
(depublished). 
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that this did not violate separation of powers,68 although it did 
acknowledge that under California’s emergency management statute, 
the effect of allowing a writ of mandamus to issue was the same as 
compelling the legislature to enact a joint resolution to end the 
emergency.69 The court also rejected the argument that the governor’s 
declaration of an emergency was a nonjusticiable political question,70 
notwithstanding that the California legislature had failed to pass a 
joint resolution or statute ending the emergency.71 
Most judicial cases read the powers of governors during 
emergencies broadly,72 but state courts do not generally classify these 
as inherent executive powers. For example, New Jersey has 
recognized that, although prison overcrowding had been a recognized 
issue for a number of years, New Jersey’s governor had the authority 
to address the issue under his emergency powers without any type of 
serious new disruption.73 His powers included the issuance of 
executive orders that contradicted statutory language.74 The New 
Jersey Supreme Court, however, treated these powers as “delegated” 
emergency powers,75 reasoning that they were not unconstitutionally 
 
 68. Id. at 16. 
 69. See id. at 16–17 (“Contrary to the Governor’s position, however, it does not follow that 
because a writ of mandate will not lie to compel the Legislature to terminate a state of 
emergency, it also will not lie to compel the Governor to do so.”). 
 70. Id. at 21. 
 71. The court noted that the “judicially manageable and discoverable standards for 
resolving” an emergency dispute appear in the statute, id. at 18, and thus did not address 
whether a constitutionally-based declaration of an emergency is nonjusticiable. 
 72. See, e.g., Adkins v. State, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 59, 64 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (observing that 
“the [Emergency Services Act] confers broad powers on the Governor to deal with 
emergencies,” including with respect to Mediterranean fruitfly eradication) (quoting Martin v. 
Municipal Court, 196 Cal. Rptr. 218, 220 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)), abrogated in non-pertinent part 
by City of Moorpark v. Superior Court, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 445 (Cal. 1998). California courts have 
also read the definition of “emergency” in various other statutes to encompass, for example, 
county property tax increases to meet budget requirements and electricity price manipulation. 
See Malibu W. Swimming Club v. Flournoy, 131 Cal. Rptr. 279, 282 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (“The 
evidence so summarized sufficiently supported the Controller’s finding of a pressing necessity, 
that is, an emergency affecting the public health and safety.”); Hendricks v. Hanigan, No. 
D037609, 2002 WL 397648, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2002) (“[A] temporary, one-time 
infusion of money to combat an immediate and pressing emergency, the loss of power to 
residents of the state through blackouts. . . . meets the definition of an emergency under its 
commonly understood meaning.”). 
 73. Worthington v. Fauver, 440 A.2d 1128, 1134–35 (N.J. 1982). 
 74. Id. at 1140. 
 75. Id. 
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broad76 and finding that they were not exercised in an arbitrary and 
capricious manner.77 
Although the broad reading of such powers seems harmless, the 
simple assertion of judicial authority to interpret emergency executive 
powers invites courts to second-guess executive determinations of 
emergencies. Indeed, some state courts have taken an excessively 
narrow reading of executive emergency powers. West Virginia’s 
Supreme Court of Appeals, for instance, has interpreted the 
constitutional powers of the executive narrowly in the context of 
prison overcrowding.78 Because West Virginia’s statute defined an 
emergency, but did not include overcrowding in the definition,79 the 
court held that the governor could not cite overcrowding as the 
reason for declaring a state of emergency.80 
Although some state courts may interpret emergency powers too 
narrowly, judicial intervention also risks interpreting these powers 
too broadly, to the point where judges—rather than politically 
accountable officials—exercise emergency powers. As an illustration 
of the mischief that may result if courts are allowed to define the 
emergency powers of state officials, consider the disputes that 
followed the Missouri governor’s decision to allow a state agency to 
deploy equipment to repair roads after massive flooding in that state. 
After the declaration of disaster, a judge in one of the counties issued 
a “preliminary order of Mandamus,” ordering the state to release 
“three motor graders, three dump trucks, one front end loader and 
competent operators for the equipment” for use by the county.81 
County sheriffs arrived at storage sheds armed with the judicial order 
and attempted to seize the equipment.82 In reviewing the legality of 
the county and the county judge’s actions, a state appellate court 
determined that the state’s management of the disaster took priority 
and deferred to the state agency, commenting that otherwise “we 
 
 76. Id. at 1141.  
 77. Id. at 1139. 
 78. See State ex rel. Dodrill v. Scott, 352 S.E.2d 741 (W. Va. 1987). 
 79. At the time, the West Virginia Code defined an emergency as “a natural or manmade 
disaster of major proportions,” and sets forth a policy of addressing “disasters of unprecedented 
size and destructiveness.” Id. at 747 (quoting W. VA. CODE § 15-5-1 (1973)).  
 80. Id. at 747–48. 
 81. State ex rel. Mo. Highway & Transp. Comm’n v. Pruneau, 652 S.W.2d 281, 284 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1983). 
 82. Id. 
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would have all chiefs and no Indians, and a Hydra without a head.”83 
Recognizing the floodgate that such claims invited for the judiciary, 
the court refused to intervene, noting that “[t]he ensuing brouhaha of 
claims of priority and superior need would be intolerable.”84 
Another important issue is whether executive powers under state 
constitutions during a crisis include the authority to spend money that 
the legislature has not explicitly appropriated. In 2004, the Kentucky 
General Assembly adjourned without adopting an executive 
department budget for the 2004–2006 biennium.85 Following the 
General Assembly’s continued failure to produce a budget, the 
governor unilaterally promulgated a “Public Services Continuation 
Plan.”86 In reaction to continued legislative failure to adopt an 
executive department budget, the Kentucky governor adopted his 
own executive department budget and ordered the state treasurer to 
fund it.87 
This fiscal crisis eventually reached the Kentucky Supreme 
Court, which refused to dismiss the issue as moot even though the 
Kentucky General Assembly later ratified the appropriations and 
expenditures under the governor’s Public Services Continuation 
Plan.88 The state supreme court also refused to treat the budget 
standoff as a nonjusticiable political question.89 Kentucky’s 
constitution does not expressly require the adoption of a budget, but 
does require Kentucky’s general assembly to raise sufficient revenues 
to cover the costs of government.90 As the Kentucky Supreme Court 
noted, however, the state constitution’s separation of powers 
provision contains an “unusually forceful command,”91 which “has no 
 
 83. Id. at 289. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Fletcher v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 852, 856 (Ky. 2005). 
 86. Id. at 858. Unlike previous governors in the state who faced the failure of the 
legislature to enact a budget, Governor Fletcher did not declare an extraordinary session of the 
General Assembly. Id. at 857–58. 
 87. Id. at 858. 
 88. Id. at 859. 
 89. Id. at 860. As the court framed the case, “The issue . . . is not the efficacy or necessity of 
a particular appropriation, but whether the Governor has any constitutional authority to 
determine what are essential services or to unilaterally order any appropriations from the 
treasury.” Id. 
 90. The requirements appear in Sections 49, 50, and 171 of Kentucky’s constitution. Id. at 
856. 
 91. Id. at 861 (quoting Ex parte Auditor of Pub. Accountants, 609 S.W.2d 682, 684 (Ky. 
1980)). 
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counterpart in the United States Constitution.”92 Specifically, the 
court observed, Section 28 of Kentucky’s constitution asserts: “No 
person or collection of persons, being of one of [the legislative, 
executive, or judicial] departments, shall exercise any power properly 
belonging to either of the others, except in the instances hereinafter 
expressly directed or permitted.”93 In the context of a strict 
construction of this provision, the court proceeded to address Section 
230 of Kentucky’s constitution, which states “No money shall be 
drawn from the State Treasury, except in pursuance of appropriations 
made by law . . . .”94 After observing that this provision is “almost 
identical” to the Appropriations Clause of the U.S. Constitution,95 the 
court stated that because the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently 
given this clause its “literal meaning” (restricting executive 
spending),96 Kentucky should do the same.97 The court did articulate 
several ways in which the legislature can appropriate funds on a 
continuing basis.98 It also held that, to the extent the Supremacy 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution99 requires compliance with a valid 
federal mandate, it can be funded by the Kentucky treasurer absent a 
specific appropriation by the state general assembly, but in other 
circumstances the executive’s assertion of spending power absent 
legislative appropriation is constitutionally suspect.100 
The Kentucky Supreme Court’s assessment of the constitutional 
budget dispute rejected Governor Fletcher’s claim that the assertion 
of emergency powers changed anything regarding the balance of 
powers to spend unappropriated funds.101 A long-recognized state 
case that had required the state treasurer to pay funds necessary to 
operate public facilities following the lifting of price controls after 
World War II was deemed by the court to be an “anomaly” to the 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. KY. CONST. § 28. 
 94. Id. § 230. 
 95. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 
 96. Fletcher, 163 S.W.3d at 864. 
 97. See id. at 864–65 (“Accordingly, we hold that . . . the unambiguous language of Section 
230 prohibits the withdrawal of funds from the state treasury.”). 
 98. Id. at 865 (“Where the General Assembly has mandated that specific expenditures be 
made on a continuing basis, or has authorized a bonded indebtedness which must be paid, such 
is, in fact, an appropriation.”). 
 99. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 100. Fletcher, 163 S.W.3d at 868. 
 101. Id. at 871. 
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extent it was not overruled altogether.102 As the Kentucky Supreme 
Court stated, “The Governor possesses no ‘emergency’ or ‘inherent’ 
powers to appropriate money from the state treasury that the General 
Assembly, for whatever reason, has not appropriated.”103 Thus, 
outside of federal preemption that requires state action,104 Kentucky’s 
governor possesses no spending power during a time of emergency 
absent legislatively approved appropriations. 
II.  PRESUMPTIVE STATE  
LAWMAKING TO AVERT INTERSTATE CRISIS 
Potential pragmatic and democratic problems can arise when 
state executives are asked to manage crises against the backdrop of 
two kinds of ambiguity: (1) ambiguity under state constitutional 
separation of powers principles, which may make it unclear whether 
state executives possess the power to act against stale statutes that 
purport to limit their authority; and (2) ambiguity under federal 
preemption doctrine, which leaves it unclear whether states have any 
jurisdiction to act at all or whether national authorities possess 
exclusive jurisdiction. Both kinds of ambiguity can allow state 
executives to evade responsibility for managing crisis, contributing to 
the blame game that plagues decisionmaking in many emergency 
management scenarios.105 The blame game is endemic to the 
interjurisdictional gray area of shared authority in many regulatory 
contexts, which demand creative solutions.106 
As a matter of state constitutional interpretation, a presumption 
of state executive lawmaking emergency authority can help to solve 
 
 102. Id. at 869–70. In a bizarre passage, the court observed that Miller v. Quertermous, 202 
S.W.2d 389 (Ky. 1947), was justified partially by a budget surplus and by expediency, Fletcher, 
163 S.W.3d at 870. Perhaps recognizing how unprincipled this interpretation is, the Kentucky 
Supreme Court concluded its rejection of Governor Fletcher’s emergency spending powers by 
stating “Miller v. Quertermous is overruled to the extent it holds or can be interpreted 
otherwise.” Id. at 871.  
 103. Fletcher, 163 S.W.3d at 871. 
 104. Of course, the constitutional status of such federal mandates is doubtful. See infra note 
138 and accompanying text. 
 105. The economic structure of this blame game is described in Ben Depoorter, Horizontal 
Political Externalities: The Supply and Demand of Disaster Management, 56 DUKE L.J. 101 
(2006). 
 106. For one discussion of how shared authority within the federalist model is problematic, 
see Erin Ryan, Federalism & The Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance in the 
Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 49–56, 89–92), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=930746. 
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these kinds of ambiguity. Recognizing that state executives possess 
such authority would squarely authorize state officials to act to 
address crisis-related issues based on inherent executive power under 
state constitutions. State courts should recognize such a presumption 
in their decisions addressing emergency powers. State court 
recognition of the presumption is not sufficient to address the broader 
authority problems that arise during emergencies, as it is doubtful 
that state courts have the power to effectuate a major change in state 
executive authority through constitutional interpretation. However, 
by setting the stage for broader acknowledgement of the role of state 
executives in the political process, state constitutions can make a 
significant difference in how emergencies are addressed. State 
legislatures should take heed of such a presumption as they update 
and pass state emergency statutes. In addition, Congress also has the 
power, in considering national legislation, to adopt a presumption 
that would clarify the role of state and local governments in 
emergency planning, whether such legislation is general in nature, as 
the Stafford Act, or more specific, as in legislation addressing health 
emergencies or natural disasters. Adoption of such a presumption by 
Congress could serve to preempt ambiguous and contrary state 
separation of powers principles. 
A. Resolving the State Separation of Powers Problem 
To grasp the constitutional source of state executive assertions of 
emergency, it is important to evaluate the power of state executives to 
act against legislation that prohibits or limits their actions. Even when 
matters fall short of an emergency (or no official declaration of 
emergency is made), existing state legislation may fail to authorize 
state executives to respond to a national or regional crisis.107 For 
example, agencies in many states lack delegated authority to approve 
the siting of new electricity transmission lines for purposes of 
enhancing national or regional (as opposed to intrastate) energy 
reliability. State legislatures have failed to update laws to authorize 
the regulation of certain pollutants under the Clean Water Act, 
limiting the ability of state environmental regulators to amend their 
 
 107. Official declaration of an emergency should be a rare event under state constitutions, 
as it can suspend rights and have other consequences for democratic accountability. By 
presenting arguments for the expansion of executive lawmaking power during times of crisis 
that fall short of emergency, I suggest an interpretive principle that expands both liberty and 
accountability under state constitutions without requiring the executive to declare emergency. 
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rules to conform to federal law, and have also failed to authorize state 
executives to broker interstate compacts regarding water usage and 
other issues. Stale state legislation can also stand as a barrier to anti-
terrorism and other law enforcement efforts.108 Given that state 
legislatures are part time and meet infrequently,109 stale laws present a 
very real barrier, even where there is widespread local consensus 
about the imminence or existence of a crisis or the implementation of 
national or regional goals. 
Particularly during times of crisis, stale legislation may contribute 
to the perception that state executives have limited authority to act to 
address crises. Emergency provisions in state constitutions provide 
some relief during the most extreme situations, but are not sufficient 
constitutional mechanisms for interstate crisis management because 
they do not speak to the ability of the executive to make law 
(including agency rulemaking authority) and may not cover even the 
most urgent interstate crisis where an official “state of emergency” 
has not yet been declared. They also may require a state to cede 
authority to non-state entities. During times of crisis, state officials 
may perceive legislative restrictions on their power to act, limiting the 
flexibility and range of response options. 
Executive power, however, can play a very positive role in 
crisis management. John Locke,110 Alexander Hamilton,111 and 
 
 108. Several of these examples, including in the environmental and anti-terrorism arenas, 
are discussed in chapter 3 of JAMES GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS: A 
JURISPRUDENCE OF FUNCTION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM (2005). 
 109. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 126–29 (Keon S. Chi et al. 
eds., 2005) (detailing the meeting time and period for each of the state legislatures). 
 110. Locke stated: 
Where the legislative and executive power are in distinct hands, as they are in all 
moderated monarchies and well-framed governments, there the good of society 
requires that several things should be left to the discretion of him that has the 
executive power. For the legislators not being able to foresee and provide by laws for 
all that may be useful to the community, the executor of the laws, having the power in 
his hands, has by the common law of Nature a right to make use of it for the good of 
the society, in many cases where the municipal law has given no direction, till the 
legislative can conveniently be assembled to provide for it; nay, many things there are 
which the law can by no means provide for, and those must necessarily be left to the 
discretion of him that has the executive power in his hands, to be ordered by him as 
the public good and advantage shall require . . . . 
JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT ¶ 159, at 89 (Prometheus 
Books 1986) (1690). 
 111. Alexander Hamilton, for instance, stated, “Energy in the executive is a leading 
character in the definition of good government.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 341 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (Terence Ball ed., 2003).  
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others112 have argued for a strong executive lawmaker. More than 
50 years ago, Justice Jackson also recognized the need for a 
flexible account of executive power, which adjusts to the 
circumstances or need for leadership: 
When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant 
or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent 
powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may 
have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. 
Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may 
sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, 
measures on independent presidential responsibility. In this area, 
any actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of 
events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract 
theories of law.113 
In cases where Congress has spoken to an issue, Justice Jackson 
characterized executive power as at its “lowest ebb.”114 Here the 
executive is bound to follow legislative commands and is constrained 
by the ordinary constitutional lawmaking process. 
Stale or obsolete legislation, however, poses a more intractable 
and less democratically resilient barrier at the state than at the 
national level. This is especially so where emergency events make 
legislation a barrier to problem solving or where there are interstate 
implications to state inaction. State executives are closer to the 
problems at hand than the federal executive. Moreover, state 
executives provide an opportunity for quick response, flexibility, and 
statewide electoral accountability for their decisions. 
Where an emergency or interstate crisis makes law obsolete, the 
powers of the executive are perhaps more appropriately characterized 
as occupying what Justice Jackson deemed to be the “zone of 
twilight”—inherent to the executive but shared concurrently with the 
legislature.115 The “imperatives of events” and “contemporary 
imponderables” that trigger the assertion of such powers will make an 
a priori definition difficult, but this does not diminish the necessity of 
such powers to executive governance. 
 
 112. For a strong defense of deference to the modern executive under the U.S. Constitution, 
see Posner & Vermeule, supra note 3. 
 113. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
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A principle of constitutional interpretation affording 
presumptive state executive lawmaking to anticipate or avert crisis 
could facilitate better crisis management at the state level. My 
proposal allows federal and state courts presumptively to authorize 
state or local executive lawmaking without giving the state or local 
executive agent absolute or permanent power. A decision based on 
such a presumption could be overridden by explicit state legislative 
action.116 Upon declaring an emergency, a state executive would call 
the legislature into emergency session, allowing the legislature to 
exercise its own powers to override the executive, either by passing a 
contrary law that is not vetoed or through supermajority vote.117 
It is not novel to suggest that executive power during times of 
crisis needs special constitutional attention, but under the U.S. 
Constitution commentators disagree on the extent to which and how 
the executive should be cabined. Professors Eric Posner and Adrian 
Vermeule suggest that strong deference to the executive under the 
U.S. Constitution may be appropriate during times of crisis.118 
Professor Bruce Ackerman argues for broader executive authority 
under the U.S. Constitution under what he calls the “Emergency 
Constitution,” which would be triggered by an attack on the United 
States and (pursuant to his proposed framework statute) would 
expire or be subject to supermajoritarian legislative override.119 
Such proposals also have significance for the interpretation of 
state constitutions. The constitutional case for a presumption of 
executive authority is stronger at the state level than at the national 
level. At a minimum, such a presumption should encompass broader 
lawmaking powers (including agency rulemaking), and generally 
should be sufficiently triggered by all interstate crises, not just attacks. 
 
 116. Elsewhere, in Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State: The Use of Federal Law to 
Free State and Local Officials from State Legislatures’ Control, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1201 (1999), 
the author creatively argues for dissecting state legislative and executive actors to implement 
federal law. While my prescription is not inconsistent with Professor Hills’ proposal, my analysis 
is focused on special rules of state constitutional interpretation that would apply in states, or 
national legislation that would preempt states, during times of interstate crisis. 
 117. Of course, if a state does not have a legislative veto, simple majority vote of both 
chambers of the legislature would suffice to override the executive. 
 118. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 3, at 606–07. 
 119. Ackerman, supra note 3, at 1059–60. For criticism of Professor Ackerman’s proposal, 
see David Cole, The Priority of Morality: The Emergency Constitution’s Blind Spot, 113 YALE 
L.J. 1753 (2004); and Laurence H. Tribe & Patrick O. Gudridge, The Anti-Emergency 
Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1801 (2004). But see Bruce Ackerman, This Is Not a War, 113 YALE 
L.J. 1871 (2004) (responding to critics). 
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Such executive authority would include not only general authority to 
issue executive orders but also broad rulemaking authority (subject to 
a state’s administrative process) that exceeds extant legislative 
delegations to the executive. This presumption would both stand to 
enhance political legitimacy during times of crisis and have a strong 
legal basis in state constitutions. 
First, at the level of political legitimacy—i.e., in terms of 
promoting good government—this approach stands to enhance the 
political legitimacy of state lawmaking within a federal system. Stale 
legislation reflects implicit (not explicit) political judgments, so a 
presumption of executive lawmaking authority to implement national 
or regional goals makes political decisions more transparent. A 
presumptive executive lawmaking approach forces either a state 
regulator or a state legislature to be explicit if it refuses to update 
regulatory laws to avert crisis. This would improve local political 
accountability by enhancing the majoritarian legitimacy of a state’s 
decision to hold to the status quo, should the state choose that course. 
Put simply, with such a presumption state executives will be able to 
act more rapidly in response to crisis and state laws will be in better 
shape to avert crisis in the first place. 
Second, this approach also has a sound basis in state 
constitutional law. Presumptive state executive lawmaking to avert 
crisis is the best interpretation of separation of powers under state 
constitutions. The positive legal rules of separation of powers vary 
from state to state.120 Regardless of positive law, however, exclusive 
vesting of lawmaking power in an exclusively legislative body through 
separation of powers is only desirable insofar as it improves the 
lawmaking process, including the primary purpose of minimizing 
factionalism in lawmaking. Due to the economics of interest-group 
decisionmaking, state and local lawmaking may be more vulnerable 
to faction and the domination of extreme interest groups than 
national politics, where the political power of extreme groups is more 
likely to be dispersed.121 
 
 120. See Rossi, supra note 14, at 1190–91 (discussing differences between strict, general, and 
non-explicit separation of powers clauses within state constitutions). 
 121. I make this argument to support executive authority to implement cooperative 
federalism programs in Jim Rossi, Dual Constitutions and Constitutional Duels: Separation of 
Powers and State Implementation of Federally Inspired Regulatory Programs and Standards, 46 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1343 (2005). 
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For example, in the case of an interstate health crisis, a state 
executive might be asked to suspend rules prohibiting the 
unauthorized practice of medicine by out-of-state physicians.122 Such 
rules serve some consumer protection function but also work to 
impede new entrants into the medical profession. Thus, any relaxing 
of the separation of powers barrier (allowing such rules to be 
suspended) would work to impede, rather than enhance, factionalism 
in state lawmaking. In this sense, as a matter of state constitutional 
law, internal (state or local) structural requirements should pose a 
minimal barrier to executive action that averts interstate crisis, 
furthering national or regional goals. 
The case for a presumption of executive authority is particularly 
strong in the context of lawmaking—such as the suspension of 
statutes and regulations, or the adoption of regulations—but there is 
also a solid constitutional basis for extending some emergency 
budgetary authority to executives. In contrast to the powers of the 
president, which have been examined in some detail,123 the general 
principles of state executive budgetary authority during a crisis are 
relatively unexamined constitutional ground. According to Professor 
Greg Sidak, the legislative supremacy view of the Appropriations 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution is flawed: 
The Framers would not have assigned to the President such 
responsibilities as the making of treaties, the commanding of the 
armed forces, and the faithful execution of laws if they expected that 
Congress could selectively veto the execution of these functions by 
defunding them. There must exist an implied power for the 
President to obligate the Treasury, at least for the minimum amount 
necessary for him to perform the duties and exercise the 
prerogatives that article II imposes on his office. To conclude 
otherwise would require embracing the unlikely proposition that 
thrift was an object more precious to the Framers than was the 
 
 122. The draft Uniform Interstate Emergency Healthcare Services Act, a current project of 
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, is designed to suspend state 
criminal and civil penalties on out-of-state physicians during times of crisis. Uniform Interstate 
Emergency Healthcare Services Act, http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/uiehsa/apr2006draft.htm 
(last visited Sept. 21, 2006). This uniform act would allow state governments to grant emergency 
licensing reciprocity on an interstate basis and to provide disaster health care workers with 
protection from civil liability. Id. §§ 5–6.  
 123. For a discussion of the history and meaning of the Appropriations Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution, see generally J. Gregory Sidak, The President’s Power of the Purse, 1989 DUKE 
L.J. 1162; and Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343 (1988). 
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perfection of a Constitution that “diffuses power the better to secure 
liberty.”124 
On Sidak’s view, the Appropriations Clause is intended to ensure 
fiscal responsibility and accountability, not legislative supremacy. 
Although the Kentucky Supreme Court spoke with confidence 
that the legislative supremacy view of fiscal appropriations has 
unambiguous constitutional support,125 it would seem that some of the 
same general principles that recognize some executive power of the 
purse at the federal level would also be applicable under state 
constitutions and especially during a crisis.126 As the dissent in the case 
addressing the emergency spending powers of Kentucky’s governor 
suggested, the state’s constitution is not a “suicide pact,”127 and the 
logical extension of severe separation of power limitations to state 
executives during a time of crisis could lead to the “destruction of 
government.”128 Understanding a presumption of state lawmaking 
authority to include some spending or appropriation power is not the 
last word, but would challenge the legislative supremacy 
understanding of appropriation powers under state constitutions, 
particularly during times of crisis. 
Of course, I am not claiming that state constitutions are incorrect 
to restrict executive spending of unappropriated funds in situations 
that fall short of an officially-declared emergency. Outside of an 
officially-declared emergency, the executive branch generally does 
not have the constitutional authority to appropriate funds. Some state 
constitutions provide for emergency appropriations by the executive 
when a state legislature cannot meet. Where, however, a state 
legislature purports to limit by statute what an executive can spend 
during a crisis, or a state constitution is silent about emergency 
appropriations, a presumption of state executive lawmaking 
recognizes that spending decisions during a crisis may be made by the 
executive, subject to legislative ratification or override. 
 
 124. Sidak, supra note 123, at 1253 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 
U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)). 
 125. See supra notes 88–104 and accompanying text. 
 126. Even the legislative control interpretation of the Appropriations Clause endorsed by 
Professor Kate Stith envisions some residual executive power to spend during times of necessity, 
which would include emergencies. Stith, supra note 123, at 1351–52. 
 127. Fletcher v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 852, 877 (Ky. 2005) (Lambert, C.J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (citing Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1959) (Vinson, C.J., 
dissenting)).  
 128. Id. 
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B. Preemption and Judicial Deference to State Executives Interpreting 
Ambiguous Federal Law During Times of Interstate Crisis 
Resolving state separation of powers barriers is necessary but not 
sufficient to establish effective state executive authority to address 
crises. State executives may also be led to inaction by ambiguities 
regarding the scope of federal preemption. To the extent that state 
executives perceive that federal law limits their authority to act, this 
may lead them to expect federal solutions to emergency problems. 
For example, in the California electricity crisis, Governor Davis 
expected federal authorities to address the issue and perceived many 
options to be preempted by federal law.129 In the wake of Hurricane 
Katrina, state officials may also have deferred to federal emergency 
officials, expecting them to take more aggressive actions that would 
preempt any state responsibility for the issue.130 In both contexts, 
however, it seems that there was uncertainty regarding the extent to 
which federal statutes or regulations, or discretionary actions of 
federal officials, may have preempted state officials. Uncertainty, and 
an expectation of federal intervention, contributes to state inaction 
and to the evasion of state responsibility for solving problems. 
A common reaction to this problem of shared authority is to 
propose a presumption against preemption, which makes it clear that 
the primary responsibility to act lies with the state, not with the 
national government.131 The presumption against preemption may be 
a necessary starting point, but it is not sufficient to address the shared 
authority problem, as shared authority can also obfuscate whom, 
within a state, has the authority to act. In this sense, the horizontal 
ambiguities under state law regarding who has authority to act may 
ironically serve as a barrier to any resolution of vertical ambiguities. 
A presumption against preemption may make it clear that a state has 
the authority to act, but this will not necessarily make it more likely 
the state will act, particularly if there is uncertainty regarding 
 
 129. See supra notes 51–58 and accompanying text. 
 130. See supra notes 59–66 and accompanying text.  
 131. For a defense of the presumption against preemption as a resistance norm in federal 
constitutional law, see Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 
1349, 1385–86 (2001); and Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can 
Improve the National Legislative Process 16 (Pub. Law & Legal Theory Res., Paper No. 27), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=412000 (highlighting how preemption doctrine can 
create poor political decisions and how a presumption against preemption better aligns 
incentives for democratic accountability). 
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authority within the state. Furthermore, the presumption against 
preemption may undermine the value of having any national 
coordination of problems at all, posing a particularly weak starting 
place for emergency or crisis management schemes. 
By contrast, a presumption of state executive lawmaking 
provides a middle ground that recognizes the value of state authority, 
resolves intrastate ambiguity, and retains national coordination 
authority. To the extent that a presumption of executive lawmaking 
attaches to state executives during times of interstate crisis, this would 
clearly authorize a state’s officials to act to fill in gaps against any 
ambiguity created under federal law. In other words, the inherent 
executive authority to manage crisis includes a state executive taking 
a position where federal law leaves room for state or local solutions. 
To the extent that a state position is not consistent with federal 
objectives, Congress or federal regulators would retain the authority 
to expressly preempt the state by taking a clearer stance—either by 
the adoption of a statute or regulation or by the exercise of 
discretionary authority. However, where federal law is ambiguous, 
federal courts would defer to state executive actors during times of 
crisis.132 
As a matter of federal constitutional law, vesting presumptive 
state or local authority to avert crisis with a state executive branch 
agent is a legitimate extension of federal preemption jurisprudence. 
The predominant judicial approach to implied preemption allows 
federal law to preempt substantive state and local legislation, but 
disfavors preemption of state constitutions.133 Presumptively 
authorizing a state or local executive to act to avert crisis adds a new 
twist to federal preemption jurisprudence: it would invite federal 
courts to preempt state and local constitutions for crisis purposes 
while leaving specific legislative judgments to state decisionmakers 
 
 132. Similarly, Professor Phil Weiser has argued for Chevron deference to state officials 
under cooperative federalism programs, such as those in the context of telecommunications 
deregulation. Philip J. Weiser, Chevron, Cooperative Federalism, and Telecommunications 
Reform, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1999) (arguing that federal statutes that call for state executive 
agencies to interpret federal law, subject only to federal review, should afford a high level of 
deference to state executive decisions).  
 133. As an illustration, in a concurrence to the opinion finding Governor Fletcher’s 
unilateral adoption of a Public Services Continuation Plan unconstitutional, Justice Keller 
maintained that Congress could not preempt Kentucky’s separation of powers provisions after 
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). Fletcher v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 852, 881 
(Ky. 2005) (Keller, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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(whether executive or legislative). According to Justice Keller’s 
concurrence to the state supreme court opinion rejecting the 
unilateral adoption of a budget by Kentucky’s governor, “[w]here 
Congress encourages state regulation rather than compelling it, state 
governments remain responsive to the local electorate’s preferences; 
state officials remain accountable to the people.”134 However, the 
presumption of state lawmaking leaves the fundamental value choice 
entirely to state officials and legislators. In no way does it trump the 
will of the electorate with respect to any substantive value regarding a 
governmental decision. Thus, in pursuing crisis-related goals, it is less 
intrusive both as a matter of law and political process for federal 
courts to preempt the state decision making process—i.e., to preempt 
structural limits in state constitutions—than it is for federal courts to 
impliedly preempt substantive legislative judgments by state or local 
lawmakers. 
There are obvious limits to this approach insofar as federally-
protected constitutional rights are invoked.135 However, there is no 
Tenth Amendment barrier, given that no state or local regulatory 
action is compelled and that it promotes democracy at the state and 
local level. Printz v. United States136 establishes clearly that Congress 
or federal regulators cannot “commandeer” state officials by 
requiring them to act.137 Although the Court in Printz spoke to the 
issue of federal mandates, it did not speak to many other questions, 
including “purely ministerial reporting requirements” imposed by 
Congress on states.138 The scope of Printz remains a matter of 
considerable uncertainty.139 On one reading, this case might be 
 
 134. Id. (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992)). 
 135. A state cannot, for instance, ignore Fifth Amendment rights in seizing private property 
during a crisis. 
 136. Printz, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 137. Id. at 935.  
 138. Id. at 936 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]he Court appropriately refrains from 
deciding whether other purely ministerial reporting requirements imposed by Congress on state 
and local authorities pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers are similarly invalid.”). 
 139. See, e.g., Hills, supra note 116, at 1231 (“In short, precedent and policy do not provide 
certain guidance about the proper role of the state and federal governments.”); Vicki C. 
Jackson, Federalism and the Use and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 
2180, 2205 (1998) (“The breadth of Printz’s effect on other federal statutes is unclear, although 
a small number of statutes are clearly invalid under Printz.”); Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a 
Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 257 (2005) (“The Court’s focus on 
dividing federal and state authority provides little assistance in addressing areas in which federal 
and state powers overlap, and the areas of concurrent authority vastly outnumber any possible 
realms of exclusive power.”). 
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understood as a meta-rule of recognition that precludes federal law 
from interfering with state constitutional commands, such as state 
separation of powers. By authorizing a state official to act, Congress 
and the federal courts through implied preemption, are, in a sense, 
commandeering a state legislature to explicitly take action if it 
disagrees with the decisions of a state executive. In contrast, on its 
own terms, the state constitution would not require any such action 
by the state legislature. 
As Professor Robert Schapiro has recognized, however, 
“[a]lthough the state political process enjoys constitutional 
protection, the particular outputs of that process do not.”140 Merely 
authorizing state officials to act, differs from requiring them to act to 
achieve a specific outcome. The presumption of executive lawmaking 
authority would leave the choice of acting or not acting with state 
officials, but clarifies who, between the state and federal system and 
within state government, has the authority to act. No specific action 
or outcome is compelled, although it is clarified that state authorities 
would have power should they choose to use it. The judgment of 
whether or not action is appropriate, for any given state, is left 
entirely to the voters of that state. In this sense, the presumption of 
state executive lawmaking would still allow the state political process 
to operate independent of the specific preferences of Congress in 
response to any given disaster. 
C. Keeping State Courts at Bay 
The scope of judicial exclusivity in interpreting state 
constitutions is under-explored.141 To the extent any presumption of 
state lawmaking authority is an inherent executive power, it cannot 
be limited by either state legislatures or by state courts. Although 
courts typically play an active role in interpreting state constitutions, 
their general role in reviewing a state executive’s emergency powers 
under separation of powers principles should be very limited. 
The leading account of state constitutions advanced by Professor 
James Gardner envisions courts as presumptively exercising the 
authority to interpret state constitutions where there are potential 
 
 140. Schapiro, supra note 139, at 286. 
 141. For an excellent analysis of exclusivity under the U.S. Constitution, see Neal Devins & 
Louis Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84 VA. L. REV. 83 (1998). 
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conflicts between state and national power.142 Gardner’s account of 
state constitutional interpretation recognizes that state courts do not 
interpret their constitutions in isolation when dealing with issues of 
federal-state coordination.143 State courts serve an important function 
in interpreting state constitutions to the extent that they provide a 
resistance against the exercise of federal power, particularly in ways 
that reduce liberty.144 
The state judicial branch, however, should not have any special 
monopoly on interpreting state constitutions—and especially with 
respect to checking federal power. For example, local officials in San 
Francisco, California, and Multnomah County, Oregon, attracted 
nationwide attention when they drew on their own interpretation of 
state constitutional guaranties of equality to issue marriage licenses to 
same-sex couples, even over the objections of governors and other 
state officials. Drawing from these disputes, Professor Norman 
Williams has argued that state executive branches and state 
legislatures have independent abilities to determine the 
constitutionality of their actions in enforcing and enacting statutes.145 
Other branches of state government can and will play as important a 
role as courts in interpreting state constitutions, but their interpretive 
task—just as much as the courts’—may depend on recognizing a 
presumption of constitutional interpretive power. 
“Extra-judicial” interpretation of state constitutions can play 
many roles, including enhancing competition among different visions 
of constitutional text and furthering political accountability for 
constitutional interpretations. It thus seems important that a theory of 
state constitutional interpretation focus not only on the presumptive 
power of courts, but also on the powers of the legislative and 
executive branches. Professor Walter Dodd, for example, viewed the 
function of state constitutions as limiting legislative power, and the 
 
 142. GARDNER, supra note 108, at 228. 
 143. Id. at 87–94. See, e.g., Dep’t of Legal Affairs v. Rogers, 329 So. 2d 257, 261–67 (Fla. 
1976) (reviewing several cases and state statutes throughout the court’s analysis); McFaddin v. 
Jackson, 738 S.W.2d 176, 181–82 (Tenn. 1987) (reviewing tax delegation decisions of several 
state supreme courts); Ex parte Elliott, 973 S.W.2d 737, 740 (Tex. App. 1998) (reviewing Texas 
case law regarding delegation). Elsewhere, I argue that implicit authorization for state executive 
and local agencies to act on behalf of federal goals is the best interpretation of state separation 
of powers, which is a matter of state constitutional law that courts should acknowledge. Rossi, 
supra note 121, at 1347–48. 
 144. GARDNER, supra note 108, at 196–97. 
 145. Norman R. Williams, Executive Review in the Fragmented Executive: State 
Constitutionalism and Same-Sex Marriage, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 565, 614 (2006). 
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main presumption for him would have been to authorize the 
legislature to act absent limiting evidence to the contrary.146 In the 
context of emergencies, state constitutions are best interpreted by the 
executive and legislative branches, not by courts.147 
Cases suggesting that executive powers during times of interstate 
crisis are delegated, or must conform to statute,148 thus fail to 
recognize the importance of inherent executive power at the state 
level and must be reassessed in terms of their generality for state 
constitutionalism. In this sense, the assertion of state executive power 
to declare law during a time of emergency should be nonreviewable 
in state courts, and is better understood as representing a political 
position to be evaluated by the state legislature.149 For example, when 
Democratic members in the Texas legislature realized that the 
passage of redistricting legislation that would favor the Republicans 
in future elections was imminent, many of these members fled the 
state to avoid a quorum. Texas’ Republican governor used his 
emergency powers to declare an “emergency special session,” calling 
the state legislature into session for purposes of addressing the 
redistricting legislation, which the legislature proceeded to pass. 
Courts were asked to untangle this dispute,150 but to the extent that 
 
 146. Walter F. Dodd, The Function of a State Constitution, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 201, 215 (1915). 
 147. The argument for extra-judicial interpretation of constitutions seems stronger at the 
state level than at the federal level, to the extent that state constitutions are more readily and 
frequently amended through referenda or by scheduled constitutional conventions. One 
rationale for regular amendment of state constitutions is to create a sort of jurisdictional 
competition with the state legislature. For instance, if the legislature fails to recognize the 
importance of a topic, such as the protection of the environment, referenda allow law reformers 
to go directly to the people with their concerns. See ELISABETH R. GERBER ET AL., STEALING 
THE INITIATIVE: HOW STATE GOVERNMENT RESPONDS TO DIRECT DEMOCRACY 2 (2001) 
(“Two factors support the notion that winning initiatives influence policy directly and 
substantially: the large number of initiatives and the style of modern initiative campaigns.”); 
Elisabeth Gerber, Legislative Response to the Threat of Popular Initiatives, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
99, 101 (1996) (“Legislators know that policy advocates (typically established interest groups) 
may propose initiatives in response to the legislation they pass or may pursue their own policy 
agenda via initiatives in response to legislative inaction.”). To the extent state constitutions are 
loaded with law reforms adopted for this reason, it would be odd to afford these law reforms the 
same constitutional status as the Bill of Rights under the federal constitution. 
 148. See supra notes 72–80 and accompanying text. 
 149. For a similar argument at the national level, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most 
Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 221 (1994) (“The 
President’s power to interpret the law is, within the sphere of his powers, precisely coordinate 
and coequal in authority to the Supreme Court’s.”). 
 150. Kris Axtman, Texas Duel Highlights Separation of Powers, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, 
Aug. 13, 2003, at 2. 
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the emergency powers of the executive are inherent constitutional 
powers, courts have little to add to such constitutional standoffs. To 
be sure, there may be a limit on the executive’s ability to declare an 
emergency over something like a redistricting vote—otherwise there 
is a strong incentive for the executive to overstate danger for the 
strategic political advantage of sustaining its own power. For this 
reason many states provide by statute for very orderly postponement 
of elections in the event of emergency.151 Such provisions were 
invoked without incident following September 11, when New York 
officials were forced to postpone the city’s mayoral elections.152 In the 
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the Louisiana governor’s declaration 
of emergency led New Orleans officials to postpone elections as 
well.153 Opportunities for political manipulation are certainly present, 
but outside of elections, as long as other constitutional provisions are 
adhered to and the legislature retains the ability to override the 
decision of state executives, little can be gained through judicial 
oversight of emergencies at the state level. In any event, given that 
these kinds of crises are not interstate crises, the constitutional 
powers of state executives are more limited than in the context of 
other emergencies.154 
 
 151. See L. PAIGE WHITAKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STATE ELECTION LAWS: 
OVERVIEW OF STATUTES REGARDING EMERGENCY ELECTION POSTPONEMENT WITHIN THE 
STATE 2 (2004) (“[S]ome states have enacted statutes providing for the temporary 
postponement of certain elections in their respective states, precincts, districts, or counties.”). 
 152. In 2001, New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani faced term limits. The primary, originally 
scheduled for September 11 but cancelled due to the terrorist attack on the Word Trade Center, 
was postponed. Mayor Giuliani’s plan to stay in office for three months beyond the expiration 
of his term was rejected by state lawmakers. See Richard Perez-Pena, Giuliani’s Quest for a 
Term Extension Hits a Wall in Albany, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2001, at D1 (“State lawmakers 
declared the idea of extending [Giuliani’s] term by 90 days all but dead . . . .”). 
 153. See John Hill, New Orleans Elections May Be Held in April, THE TIMES (Shreveport, 
La.), Dec. 18, 2005, at 1A, available at http://www.shreveporttimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/ 
article?AID=/20051218/NEWS01/512180322/1002/NEWS (“During its special session last 
month, the Louisiana Legislature added to election law a procedure that gives the secretary of 
state’s office the power to declare an emergency and set up a plan for another election, 
requiring the approval of two legislative committees, the state attorney general, the governor 
and the Legislature.”). Displaced Louisiana voters challenged the date of the election, but a 
U.S. District Court judge would not allow the election to be suspended beyond May, the date 
specified in the New Orleans charter. See Sam Quinones, Judge Rejects Suit to Open New 
Orleans Poll Stations Around U.S., L.A. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2006, at A9.  
 154. A state emergency that affects national elections, for example, would give rise to a 
stronger argument for inherent executive power to suspend or postpone elections. Given that a 
delayed national election would likely interest Congress as much as state governors, federal 
preemption of a state’s idiosyncratic election postponement decisions would seem likely. 
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Certainly, any presumption of executive lawmaking authority 
during times of crisis is not without controversy. The case for a strong 
executive at the federal level has generated much criticism,155 and it 
could be expected that a strong state executive would do the same. 
However, the arguments for a strong executive at the state level are 
stronger than at the national level. The two strongest objections to 
the presumption of lawmaking authority during a crisis are that it 
could result in an ongoing assertion of “emergency” or “crisis” 
powers, and that it could be abused by state executives in ways that 
undermine civil rights. Neither objection withstands scrutiny. 
In his concurrence to Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.,156 which 
held that President Truman lacked the inherent executive power to 
seize steel mills during a wartime labor dispute, Justice Jackson raised 
the concern that “emergency powers would tend to kindle 
emergencies.”157 Executives could claim emergencies for no good 
reason, and emergencies would have no end—once declared, an 
emergency might generate its own special justification for the exercise 
of power with no opportunity or incentive to limit it.158 These are 
legitimate concerns, especially when applied to the office of the 
president, but there are additional checks and balances at the state 
level to avoid strategic declaration of emergencies. Of course, as with 
the federal executive, one check built into the strong state 
presumption of executive lawmaking authority is the state legislature, 
 
 155. See Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign 
Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 551–52 (2004) (countering the claim that the Vesting Clause, 
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1, grants the president broad residual powers not specified in Article 
II); Erwin Chemerinsky, Controlling Inherent Presidential Power: Providing a Framework for 
Judicial Review, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 863, 887–95 (1983) (arguing that courts should evaluate 
challenges to presidential acts that lack express statutory or constitutional authorization by 
determining whether they infringe on legislative or judicial powers); Henry P. Monaghan, The 
Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 11 (1993) (concluding that the 
president has lawmaking power only over protection of “personnel, property, and 
instrumentalities of the United States”); Paulson, supra note 149, at 221–22 (arguing that the 
president has powers co-equal to other branches in interpreting his own powers); H. Jefferson 
Powell, The President’s Authority over Foreign Affairs: An Executive Branch Perspective, 67 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 527, 529, 545–49, 554–76 (1999) (defending the president’s primary 
constitutional authority over foreign affairs). See generally Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. 
Calabresi & Anthony J. Colangelo, The Unitary Executive in the Modern Era, 1945–2004, 90 
IOWA L. REV. 601 (2005) (surveying the history of the unitary executive). 
 156. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 157. Id. at 650 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 158. See id. (“[The framers] knew what emergencies were, knew the pressures they 
engender for authoritative action, knew, too, how they afford a ready pretext for usurpation.”). 
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which has the power to override the executive. However, another 
layer of checks is the federal government, which has the power to 
adopt a law or regulation that preempts a state emergency. Given that 
the presumption of state executive lawmaking is at its strongest where 
states are addressing interstate emergencies, the risk of strategic use 
of the presumption for purposes of political advancement by state 
executives is limited. Moreover, once state courts have the 
opportunity to define the crisis threshold, abuses of emergency 
powers by state executives can be cabined. Not every important 
policy problem will qualify as a crisis, which is a unique lawmaking 
event in that it is unexpected, requires immediate action, and has 
unambiguously negative consequences if left unaddressed.159 A 
presumption of state executive lawmaking would encourage state 
courts to contribute to the dialogue of classifying the kinds of events 
(such as natural disasters, terrorist attacks and interstate crises) that 
are in fact crises and those events (such as poor policy or bad political 
choices) that are not. 
Arguments for a strong executive during times of crisis at the 
federal level have generated much controversy, largely centered 
around the implications of unbridled executive power for civil 
rights,160 but any concern that strong state executive authority at the 
state level will undermine civil rights, or lead to massive civil rights 
abuses, is unfounded. If, during a time of state-declared emergency, a 
state executive were to encroach on a constitutionally protected right, 
the person whose right was violated would not be without legal 
recourse. Adjudication of civil rights or constitutional violations in 
federal court would still be available, because the Bill of Rights is 
incorporated to the states and would trump contrary state law 
concerns.161 In this sense, the case for a strong executive at the state 
 
 159. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 160. See Cole, supra note 119, at 1768 (“In fact, emergency powers take almost as many 
forms as emergencies do, and raise a host of difficult and distinct civil liberties questions . . . .”); 
see also David Cole, Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual Rights in 
Times of Crisis, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2565, 2594 (2003) (arguing that, through stare decisis, courts 
can develop principles for managing constitutional emergencies). Cole seems overconfident 
about the federal judiciary’s ability to develop principled and useful precedents for managing 
crisis. Even, if his arguments make a compelling argument for judicial review at the federal 
level, it is my claim that they are substantially weaker when applied to constitutional 
emergencies at the state level. 
 161. Should the U.S. Constitution suspend the same protections during time of emergency, a 
state constitution would provide no less civil rights protections during time of emergency—but 
also no more. 
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level is stronger than the case for a strong national executive, as civil 
rights or constitutional remedies are more likely to present a direct 
conflict with the assertion of national executive power.162 
Ultimately, how executive power is conceived under state 
constitutions should have implications for the state emergency 
framework statutes that are passed by legislatures to manage 
executive decisionmaking during interstate crisis. To the extent that 
state executive power to declare and manage interstate crisis is an 
inherent constitutional power, state framework statutes cannot limit 
the situations in which an executive can declare a crisis. Such statutes 
also cannot limit the procedures under which state executives manage 
interstate crisis. Such statutes can, however, delimit legislative 
processes for overriding the executive during times of crisis and are 
best limited to this topic. They also can clarify the issue of interstate 
reciprocity,163 which may be fundamental to successful state-led 
management of crisis, although the analysis of this Article would 
suggest that reciprocal concessions are an inherent state executive 
power. State legislatures addressing emergency management statutes 
should recognize that many provisions in these statutes, such as limits 
on the emergency powers of an executive or limits on the definition of 
an emergency, are constitutionally questionable and create ambiguity 
regarding the power of state executives to act during a crisis. A more 
constructive legislative approach would be focused on framework 
processes for legislative checks on state executive lawmaking 
authority during emergencies, including legislative processes for 
overriding legal and budgetary decisions of the executive, rather than 
on micromanaging emergency powers. 
The constitutional presumption of state executive lawmaking 
also has implications for Congress, as it reconsiders statutes dealing 
with general emergency management, as well as more specific 
statutes. As the analysis above suggests, Congress has the power to 
 
 162. I am not, for example, suggesting that “departmentalism”—the view that an entity has 
the authority to interpret the constitutional provisions applied against it where there is not a 
specific constitutional interpretation to the contrary—extends to states as well as to national 
branches of the government. See Dawn E. Johnsen, Functional Departmentalism and 
Nonjudicial Interpretation: Who Determines Constitutional Meaning?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 105, 117 (Summer 2004) (“Emphasis on the independent status of the branches, and the 
perceived need to maintain rigid lines and rules, leads many self-described departmentalists to 
positions of absolute or near-absolute interpretive autonomy for each branch in the exercise of 
its responsibilities.”). 
 163. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
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adopt a statute that preempts any ambiguity regarding state executive 
emergency powers under state constitutions. For example, in the 
context of a statute such as the Stafford Act,164 Congress could 
authorize state executives to adopt regulations and expend state 
funds during a crisis, even when a state legislature has not delegated 
such authority to a state executive ex ante. As long as Congress leaves 
the specific political decision to adopt a regulation or expend funds to 
a politically accountable state actor, such as a state governor, there is 
no constitutional barrier to Congress adopting an across-the-board 
recognition of the presumption of state executive lawmaking during 
times of crisis. 
Moreover, in the context of subject-specific legislation, Congress 
could recognize the presumption of state executive lawmaking as a 
way to facilitate better federal-state coordination in the resolution of 
important problems. For example, in emergency health legislation, 
Congress could authorize state executives to take action even absent 
delegated authority from a state legislature. In areas such as electric 
power regulation, where Congress has addressed federal management 
of electric transmission reliability,165 Congress could authorize a state 
Governor, or a specific state agency official, to take action regarding 
the siting of transmission lines or power plants even absent delegated 
legislative authority. Such subject-specific adoption of a presumption 
of state executive lawmaking may allow Congress to assist states in 
clarifying the authority of state executives to act to solve problems 
during a crisis. 
CONCLUSION 
It is beyond controversy that state government responses to 
recent crises, such as the California electric power crisis and 
Hurricane Katrina, could have been quicker and more aggressive. 
Perhaps the deficiency in response to these crises was just politics. 
Leadership failures at the state and local level might explain a lag in 
 
 164. See supra notes 8–11 and accompanying text (discussing federal-state coordination in 
the Stafford Act framework). 
 165. For instance, in the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Congress extended to federal regulators 
authority over backstop transmission siting, as well as the ability to set federal reliability 
standards for electric transmission. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1221, 119 
Stat. 594, 946–52. Neither of these provisions, however, addresses the state regulatory process 
involving siting.  
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response. On this view, the problem could be solved in the next round 
of elections by voting for better leaders. 
However, because political leadership does not operate 
independent of constitutional and legal frameworks, crisis 
management problems will likely surface again. It is well recognized 
that blurred jurisdictional lines between federal and state officials 
may have contributed to the problem with recent crisis response.166 
Although it is tempting to respond to this problem with an across-the-
board expansion of federal authority, I have argued in this Article 
that a lack of clarity regarding the scope of executive power within a 
state can also pose a barrier to effective crisis management at the 
state and local level. This is unfortunate, as state and local executive 
officials are closest to the problems at hand and, as between different 
institutional actors, frequently possess the most flexibility in approach 
and political accountability to address them. 
Presumptive executive power to respond to interstate crisis—and 
to act proactively to avert it—stands to empower state executives to 
take a more central role in the political process while also helping to 
improve the quality of state lawmaking. Such a presumption would 
recognize that state executive emergency powers are inherent to the 
executive but also are shared with a state legislature and, potentially, 
with Congress. This proposed presumption has practical implications 
not only for state courts in addressing separation of powers disputes 
but also for state legislatures, as they adopt emergency framework 
statutes, and Congress, as it considers various reforms designed to 
address emergencies. Ultimately, the presumption might best be 
utilized as a drafting canon by Congress in federal statutes and 
regulatory programs, as a way to preempt potential state 
constitutional barriers to crisis management that can stand in the way 
of well-intentioned federal programs. 
The benefits to presumptive executive lawmaking at the state 
and local level are many and its constitutional barriers are minimal. It 
would be unwise to think that attention to state and local executive 
authority is going to eliminate disasters or tragedies. But there is 
ample evidence of a need to clarify the authority of state and local 
actors to respond to a crisis. The proposed presumption of state 
executive lawmaking would fill this need. More important, it would 
 
 166. See Walters & Kettl, supra note 7, at 20 (“What is more critical . . . is the need to 
explicitly and thoroughly define governments’ roles and responsibilities so that officials in other 
jurisdictions don’t suffer the same sort of meltdown in the next natural or man-made disaster.”). 
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give state executives a more proactive role in crisis aversion, making 
it less likely that the state executive will be able to escape 
responsibility for crisis planning and management. 
